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BOND YIELDS, ECONOMIC 'DRIFT', AND THE PRICES OF
COMMON STOCKS
IN THE preceding chapter we discussed the relation of the movements
of bond yields to the grade of the bonds. At one stage of that dis-
cussion we introduced a scatter diagram containing not only bond
yields but also the yields of preferred stocks. To go One step further
and bring into the picture common stocks, the most junior securities
of all, leads to some interesting results. But, before presenting those
results, it is desirable to refresh. the reader's memory of the nature of a
corporation and the relation of bondholders and stockholders to the
corporation and to each other.
A corporation is a juristic person; in the words of the Dartmouth
College Case it is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing
only in contemplation of law". It is capable of acting in many but not
in all respects as though it were a natural person. As a legal entity,
it takes and holds property, and conveys the same; it contracts obliga-
tions, and it sues and is sued, in its corporate name, in the same manner
as a natural person. For such purposes, the stockholders or 'members'
of the corporation are disregarded. They compose the corporation, but
they are not the corporation.'
Though the stockholders may be thought of as owning the corpora-
tion, they do not own and cannot convey the corporate property.2 But
'We must not obscure our present discussion by overloading it with exceptions and
qualifications. For example, it is, of course, true that the concept of the corporation
as a legal entity, separate and distinct from the members who compose it,isa
mere legal fiction, introduced for the convenience of the corporation and of those
who do business with it; and that, under certain circumstances, the fiction will, be
disregarded, and the fact that the corporation is really a collection of individuals be
recognized in equity and even at law.
2Thisis technically true even when all the stock is owned by one lerson. White the
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they have a definite beneficial interest in the corporate property, as
may be seen from the fact that the courts have held that interest insur-
able.It is true that, upon dissolution, the legal title to the corporate
pioperty does not vest in the stockholders, but they still retain the
beneficial interest therein, and, if the legislature has made no provision
by which they can reach the property, and enforce their rights. they
may come into a court of equity, and obtain relief. Such a court has
jurisdiction, unless it has been taken away by statute, to reach the
property of the defunct corporation, to cause the debts due it to be
collected, and to distribute the assets, after payment of the creditors,
to the beneficial owners, that is, to the members or stockholders.
The stockholders' beneficial interest in the corporate property extends
to the profits of the corporation. A stockholder has the right not only
to participate in dividends when they are declared but also to maintain
a suit in equity to compel the directors to declare and pay a dividend
if it is wrongfully withheld.
The bondholder is a creditor of the corporation. His claims are prior
to those of the stockholder but they are limited and he has no vote nor,
so long as the corporafion is living up to its pronilses, has he any
means of controlling the management. But, aside froni the voting privi-
lege, the interests of the bondholder and the stockholder in the corpo-
ration differ fundamentally only with respect to priority and
The corporation is a cow from which each hopes to obtain milk.
And priority and limitation are not confined to bonds. Though the
preferred stockholder may he classed by the law with the common
stockholder he will tend to be classed by the econonhist with the holder
of an income bond. And even the law has been known to waver in its
discussion of preferred stocks and preferred stockholders. For ex-
ample, some courts have held that a corporation has the power to create
and issue preferred stock on the ground that such a transaction is
virtually a borrowing of money, and that corporations have the power
to borrow. money, and may do it in this way.
The common stock is a l)lood brother of the preferred stock and
the bond. Investments as a class constitute one family. They each
originate in an exchange of present money for an expectation of future
(Footnoteconcluded)
corporation exists, he is a mere stockholder of it, and nothing else. Cf. Button v.
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money. If it were not for such an expectation they would have no
exchange value. And they lose that value as the expectation dies out.
The demand that conies from the possibility of buying them and later
selling at a profit may exist for a time in a sort of economic vacuum,
but it is essentially a derived demand and, in the absence of any (war-
ranted or unwarranted) expectation of future returns, it sooner or
later disappears.
Because the good that the common stock offers to its purchaser is
an expectation of future money payments, the relation of its present-
money price to its future-money payments is as unmistakably an interest
phenomenon as is relation of the present-money price of a bond
to its future-money payments. In the fullness of time the stock will
have a 'realized' or 'actual' yield just as will the bond. And, though
the stock makes no 'promise', as does the bond, and therefore has no
'promised' or 'hypothetical' yield, its price discounts estinjated future
the bond.5 It is the absence of
promises and the high degree of uncertainty as to what the stock will
pay, with the resulting inadequate forecasting, that obscures the interest
relation. The fundamental difference between an ultra high grade
extremely long term bond and a low grade common stock is that the
future-money returns of the bond can be forecast with more assur-
ance than can those of the stock. That an individual investor may pre-
fer the one type of security to the other, because he believes that their
market prices do not correctly measure the differences in their respec-
tive future probabilities, is a matter that concerns individual forecasting
of future payments but neither individual nor market discounting of
those payments.4
The promises contained in the bond are not merely assurances that,
if possible. certain sums will he paid. They are also maximum values
For discussion of the terms assumption of payment, promised or hypothetical
yield, and realized or actual yield, see Chapter II. In this book the term yield, unless
the. context makes it apparent that realized or actualyield isreferred to, means
promised or hypothetical yield.
For example, that bonds are almost inevitably a poorer investment than common
stocks or' the eve of a great currency inflation is evidence merely of bad market I ore-
c2sting of how the inflation will affect the future money payments of the stocks.
The rates at which future money is, at such a time, being discounted may be high
or low, but, because they apply to the anticipated money payments of both the stocks
and the bonds, they cannot explain why one is a better investment than the other.
It is the error in the which explains that.'DRIFT' AND COMMON STOCK PRICES 131
that cannot be exceeded. This is, of course, true of preferred stocks
also. If the corporation is earning enough, the maximum values will
year after year be the realized values. And this limitation leads to sta-
bility—the stability of a toy balloon pressfng against the ceiling of a
room. If the gas begins to escape, the balloon may drift clown to the
floor. But, only if it were outdoors could it ever soar to the clouds.
There are upper and lower limits to the return from a bond. The re-
turn from a common stock has no necessary upper limit. Dividends may
soar to the sky, but their only permanent level of stability is on the
ground—with the corporation bankrupt.
The 'assumption of payment', which must be made before the prom-
ised or 'hypothetical' yield of a bond can be calculated (or obtained
from a bond table), may, as we have seen, be a mere mathematical fic-
tion for all except the highest grade of bonds. But, for common stocks
it is not only a mathematical fiction but also an economic absurdity.
Even' if the chance that the promises contained ina bond will be kept
is so negligibly small that the promises are little more than mere words,
they are at least definite words and, as such, can stand the strain of
mathematical manipulation.
But the common stock contains no promises. It is, of course, true
that after sale, in other words after theevent,the realized or 'actual'
yield may be calculated for the period that the stock was held and for
the ex-holder with the same assurance that it could have been calculated
had the stock been a bond,5 but the promised or 'hypothetical' yield
completely eludes definite determination unless assumptions are intro-
duced that are so grossly conjectural as to be virtually supposititious.
And even small variations in the assumptions affect greatly. the hypo-
thetical yields. The assumptions must extend far into the future. Theo-
retically, they must specify exactly the amounts and dates of all future
payments. Of course, practically it is not necessary to take into account
those payments that are to occur in the far distant future. But the
future period that may be neglected is much more distant than the
reader might imagine had he not carefully considered the matter. If
it be assumed that a share of common stock selling for $100 is to
return $4 per annum forever, it may be thought of as having a prom-
or 'hypothetical' yield of 4 per cent per annum. But, if the pay-
This realized yield is,of not to be confused with the realized yield on
a bond that has been held to maturity—or default.132 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
ments are to cease at the end of sixty years, the hypothetical yield
must be less than per cent per annum.° If they are to cease at the
end of 46 years, the yield must be less than 3 per cent per annum. If at
the end of 35 years, the yield must be less than 2 per cent per annum.
If they continue just 25 years, the yield will be exactly zero ler cent
\Vith still shorter periods, the yields are negative.
If such an assumption were made as that the dividend 1a.ynlents were
to increase in geometric progression, the future that could be neglected
would be still more distant. One of the strangest rationalizations of
unending price rise that appeared in. the months immediately preceding
the stock market culmination of 1929 was evolved by a Wall Street
economist He presented to the directors 6f the investment trust with
which he was associatedstatistical evidence that the wealth of the
cotintry increased inlong run about 3 per cent per annum. He then
argued that corpo•ration.s as a class should he expected to share in this
growth at this rate and hence that their dividends should be expected,
over the long run, to increase at least 3 per cent per annum; that
is to say in such a series as $4.12, $4.24, $4.37, etc., or $4(1.03),
$4 (1.03)$4 etc. He then suggested that, with increasing
financial stabilization of the country, these future dividends would
eventually be discounted at a rate that would not exceed 3 per cent
per annum. But, he continued, if distant enough payments were as-
sumed, discounting them at this rate would give very high prices for
the stocks. The suggestion was even made that, as there seemed to be
no necessary time limit to the 3 per cent rate of growth in wealth, there
should logically be no 'ceiling' whatever for stock prices.7 The phantasy
0Thepresent values of the future payments, discounted at per cent per annum,
are $1.035'(1.035)2$(1.035)a
,etc.Now, from any ordinary compound
interest and annuity table we may find that the sum of 60 terms of this series
equals $4(24.9447) or about $99.78. Therefore, if the stock isselling at $100, the
yield is a little less than 3'/2 per cent per annum.
II the dividends were $4(1.03), $4(1.03)2, $4(1.03)3, etc.,as in the illustration
of the text, and if these dividends were discounted at 3 per cent per annum, the
price of a share of the stock that was to pay the dividends should be just four
times the numberofpaymentsthatwere to be made; in other words, four times
the number ofyears thatthe succession of dividends was to continue, even if nothing
whatever was to be paid thereafter.The value of each future dividend
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was strangely reminiscent of the Petersburg Paradox in the mathemat-
ical theory of probability.
On the other hand, it is of course true that, in pricing stocks, the
market undoubtedly attempts to estimate their earnings and dividend
probabilities for at least the near future. To the investor, past earnings
and dividends, except in so far as they offer clues to the future, are
mere 'water over the dam'. Dividing last year's dividends by the present
sellin.g price of a stock will, produce a function that, for certain very
restricted purposes, niay be of some interest to the student of eco-
nomic history and the business cycle; but it is highly undesirable to
call the function a 'yield' and thus, by the use of terms, insidiously to
suggest that it is of the same nature as the ('hypothetical') yield of a
bond.
Though the terms of a bond's promise of future money payments
change with the passage of tinie (as the maturity date approaches.),
they change in a slow and definite mathematical manner. Unless the
time to maturity be very short, or the dates for which comparisons
are made be very far apart, no great change in the yield of a bond can
occur without a change in price. For short periods, the yield of a long
term bond is virtually a function of onevariable—theprice of the bond.
But the 'yield' of a stock is essentially a function. of twovariables.This
difference is clearly apparent if we compare the 'yields' of stocks with
the yields of perpetual bonds. The (hypothetical) yield per cent of
Canadian Pacific debenture 4's (bonds that are perpetuities) will always
be 400 divided by the price ofa $100 bond. But the 'yield'
per cent of Canadian Pacific common stock, whether it be taken as
(100 times) the preceding year's total dividends divided by the present
price of the stock or as some more complicated expression, will always
he essentially afunctionof two variables—a fluctuating priceand a
fluctuating rate. Sudden and great 'changes in the calculated
a stbck occur not only because of changes in price but also
because of changes in. dividend rate.
To compute either bond yields or stock yields, assumptions must
be made concerning future payments. The computer of stock yields
usually assumes that payments in the future will be at the same annual
rate as they were in the immediate past. Having made this totally un-
warranted assumption, he plunges into refinements. If an 'extra' or
unexpected dividendl)e paid, he labors like the mountain to decide134 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
whether it is truly an 'extra' or should be considered as normal and
'regular'. If his decision whether it will or will not be regularly repeated
turns out to be wrong, he 'revises' his preceding year's index of yields.8
And if the yields, as he calculates them, seem abnormally high or
abnormally low, he tacitly suggests that future 'revisions' will probably
correct his figures. He speaks of 'real' yields, meaning by the term what
his yields will be when the future is known and all his 'revisions' com-
pleted. And all most seriously.9
The market's valuation of both second grade bonds and common
stocks may, for the purpose of throwing light on our present problem,
be thought of as though it were a process of consciously forecasting
interest or dividend payments and then discounting them at some par-
ticular rate of interest.'0 The (hypothetical) yield of a second grade
bond is then high, not because the promised future interest payments
are discounted at a high rate but because of the low degree of expecta-
tion that the payments that will actually be made will be as great as
the promised payments. It is as though the expected future payments,
which for a high grade bond are taken as identical or virtually identical
with the promised payments, are for a second grade bond taken as only
8Oneof the largest financial 'services' in the United States writes: "On occasional
instances, a consistent handling oilthesituation is impractical and arbitrary decisions
must be substituted. This may at times necessitate revising a part of the recent data."
Sometimes the 'yields' of stocks seem, to their computers, abnormally low or
abnormally high on almost any of the various bases used for calculating them; for
example, in September 1929. However, even at that time the fact that prices were
unusually large multiples of immediately preceding dividends was accepted only as
evidence and not as proof that 'real' yields were abnormally low. The mooted ques-
tion was whether earnings could increase sufficiently in the future to carry such
extremely high prices.If the immediate future of earnings had been known, it
would undoubtedly have been generally realized that stock prices were relatively
even higher than their 'yields' suggested. Dividends had been increasing, and the
fall in 'yields' was therefore not as great as the rise in prices. If 'yields' could have
been calculated on the basis of the dividends to be paid in the not too distant future
instead of those paid in the immediate past, they would have fallen even more
than prices rose.
10Whata business is earning is,of course, more fundamentally important thaii
what it is currently paying. If a corporation be earning much more than it is paying
out in dividends, the stock will tend to sell on a relatively low 'yield' basis. When
conditions are reversed, the stock will tend to sell on a high 'yield' basis. The ratio
of price per share to earnings per share is a function that has been calculated and
presented in much the same manner as the stock 'yield' concept. It has almost all
the technical drawbacks of the yields concept with the additional one that earnings
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some proper fraction of what is promised. The yield of the second
grade bond is high because of the difference between the expected and
the promised payments. But in so far as the analogy can be carried
through at all, the 'yield' of a common stock is high because of the
difference between the expected payments and the rate at which pay-
ments have recently been made. But recent rates of payment, though
they may in exceptional circumstances turn out to be the same as
future rates, are not the same as and cannot be substituted for promises.
If such an illegitimate substitution be made, we are faced with the
difficulty that, when the are actually broken, the 'yield' will
fall violently; and, even after adjustment to the new conditions, may
be no higher than before the promises were broken. If, at the time
that the dividend payments on a stock paying $8 per annum are about
to be cut to $4 per annum, the stock be selling for $100 a share, its
yield will fall immediately after the cut—unless the price instantly de-
clines to $50 a share. And, unless the price falls below $50 a share,
the new 'yield' will be no higher than the 'yield' before the dividend
cut. When dividends are completely eliminated, 'yields' immediately fall
to zero. Though the 'yield' of a stock may have been, before the elimi-
nation of dividends, as high as the yields of very low grade bonds, after
the elimination it becomes lower than the yields of bonds of even the
very highest grade.It seems clear that, whatever else it may be, a
(hypothetical) stock. 'yield' is not an animal of the same species, or
even genus, as a (hypothetical) bond yield.
Not only economists and statisticians but also investors and business
men, when comparing the market's valuation of two bonds, tend to
express that valuation in terms of the yields of the bonds rather than
in terms of their conventional 'prices'. Though conventional 'price' is
a price and the yield is only a function of a price, the price of which
the yield is a function is, to the extent that there is warranty for 'the
assumption of payment', a more expressive, enlightening, and pertinent
price than the merely conventional price. Indeed, the conventional price
of even a high grade bond is, singly and by itself, almost destitute of
meaning. The quantity of the 'good' to which the dollars of the price
are related is not adequately specified. The price is, by convention, the
price per $100 of 'face value'. But 'face value' tells us only theamount
of the last payment. It says nothing about when that payment is to
be made or about the amount and timing of other payments thatare136 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
to be made in the interim. And these facts are essential. As a unit of
the good, $100 of 'face value' not merely is inadequate but also may
be completely meaningless. Its reductio ad absurdum occurs with per-
petuities—in which 'face value' is not even promised.
It is true that the price of which the yield is most simply and
directly expressible as a function is analogous to the price of money
in terms of a commodity rather than the price of a commodity in
terms of money. But this inverse relationship leads to no difficulties.
To state that the yield of a bond is 5 per cent per annum is to state
that the relation between the conventional price of the bond and the
promised future payments is as it would be if a promised payment of
$105 due any time before maturity were worth $100 payable one year
earlier. As a corollary, we have the less general conclusion that the
price which, minus unity, equals the yield of the bond is a price of a
unit of money in ternis of promised money due one year hence.'1
For comparing, the market's valuation of two bonds, conventional
prices are, by themselves, quite useless.But they may give us some
information if the comparison is between the market's valuation of a
bond at one date and its valuation of the san'te bond at another date.
No necessary conclusion can be drawn from the fact that, even on the
same date, one bond sells for 90 and another bond for 110. But if, at
one time, a bond sells for 90 and, at another time, for 110, we know
at least that the yield was lower at the 110 price than it was at the 90
price. A change in yield must occur whenever a bond crosses par. Also,
a change in yield must occur whenever, from an earlier to a later date,
the plus or minus deviation of the price of a bond from par increases
absolutely (not algebraically). And, if the bond he a perpetuity, we
are not restricted to such vague and special non-quantitative conclu-
sions.
Because the importance of the final or 'face. value' payment decreases
with an increase in time to maturity, comparison of the market's valua-
tion of two bonds by means of their mere conventional prices (per $100
of 'face value') reaches its reductio ad absurdurn, as we have noticed,
when there is to be no final payment, in other words when the bonds
are perpetuities. However, if the comparison is of valua-
Thisis all, of course, 'as if'. Unless we make the arbitrary and unreal assumption
of uniformity in the rates of discount used in each future compounding interval,
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tion of a perpetuity at one date and its valuation of the same perftetuity
at another date, conventional price tells exactly the same story as yield.
If yield halves, price doubles, etc. The yield of a perpetuity is merely
a constant multiple of the reciprocal of the conventional price of the
perpetuity.
The advantage of knowing and using not only the conventional price
but also this multiplier, in other words the advantage of using yield,
when comparing the market's valuation of the same perpetuity at
ferent times, is that the yield gives an indication of grade and the con-
ventional price (by itself) gives none. Our discussion (Ch. IV) of the
relation of movement of yield to yield itself (as an index of grade)
would have been impossible in terms of mere conventional prices, even
if all our bonds had been perpetufties. But conventional prices, though
they would not. have related movements to grades, would, if all the
bonds had been perpetuities, have told US just as much about the move-
ments themselves as did yields.
Strictly speaking, common stocks have no grade in the sense in which
the term is used of bonds, the sense in which, other things being equal,
highness of grade shows itself in lowness of yield. The 'grade' of a
bond depends upon the capacity of the issuing corporation to fulfill the
promises contained in the bond. Yield may he low and grade high be-
cause of the greatness of the corporation's capacity or because of the
smallness of its promises. If the most senior issue of a corporation be
small enough, the bonds may remain 'first grade' throughout a receiv-
ership. But common stocks are most commonly described as 'high grade'
when their dividends have been large and regular or even increasing,
and low grade when they have been ml, small and irregular or decreas-
mg. The 'yield' of the stock has little or no relation to this concept of
grade. Price is its real indicator. The poorest grade of common 'stocks
will have the lowest 'yields'—namely zero; and the 'yields' of all com-
mon. stocks will' be related to the market's estimates of the of
their dividend possibilities rather than to the degree of assurance with
which those dividends can be forecast. A prospect of increasingly large'
dividends will lower the 'yield' of a common stock, but a bond whose
coupons called not for uniform but for increasing payments would not,
because of that f act, sell on a lower yield basis.
But, though common stocks cannot be classified as to grade in the
same way that bonds can their place in the investment family,138 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
which bonds and preferred and common stocks all belong, may be de-
scribed in terms of a concept that is at least related to the concept of
bond grade. This concept is the concept of priority. If there be two
bonds of the same corporation that differ only as to their seniority.
the more senior bond will be of a higher 'grade' than the less senior, be-
cause its claim to payment will be prior to that of the less senior bond.
And, if the corporation have preferred stock outstanding, that stock
will (except in very unusual circumstances) be of a lower 'grade' than
any of the corporation's bonds. In this sense, the common stock will he
of a still lower grade. The claims of all the bonds will be prior to those
of the preferred stock and the claims of the latter prior to the claims
of the common stock.
Of course, such a classification by priority, embryonic as it is,is
strictly possible only with the securities of a single corporation. But the
fact that common stocks are junior to the other securities of their own
corporations and hence, as a group, more uncertain as to their future
payments than bonds suggests that the fluctuation.s in the valuations
placed upon them by the market should be expected to be more like
those of low grade than those of high grade bonds. And they are so.
There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. Some common
stocks act more like high grade than really low grade bonds. But the
generalization holds of common stocks as a group. Our future discus-
sion therefore runs in terms of index members and not in terms of
individual stocks. And the index numbers are, of course, index num-
bers of stock prices, and not index numbers of stock 'yields'. The con-
cept of stock 'yield' is, as we ha'v'e seen, quite useless for our purposes.
The stocks whose prices are used in this book are all American rail-
road stocks. Our decision to restrict ourselves to railroad stocks was
not made merely because of the relationship between railroad stocks and
railroad bonds. It is true that, in recent years industrial and public
utility stocks have been rel.ativel.y more important in the American
and investment markets than railroad stocks. railroad
stock prices present not merely a much more homogeneous but also a
Imuch longer series.12 Our railroad stock price indexes go back monthly
12 Cf. Wesley C. Mitchell, Cycles,pp. 170, 171:
"The number of industrial stocks regularly bought and sold on the market
in every year since 1890 is too small to make significant averages."
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to January 1857—a period of seventy-nine years. Until, about 1909 the
railroad stock market was the American security market par excellence.
Only in the last twenty years or so has its relative importance seriously
declined.
We have not used the prices of preferred stocks. The number of rail-
road preferred stocks paying dividends regularly and having their prices
quoted has always been so small as to prevent an index of their prices
having any broad general significance. And, whether they paid divi-
dends or not, it seemed undesirable to mix them with the common
stocks.
The list of stocks used includes, at all times, virtually all the railroad
common stocks whose prices were being regularly quoted on any of
the great exchanges. The names of the railroads and the periods dur-
ing which their stocks were used is graphiéally exhibited in Chart 32.
Most of the changes in the list were made necessary or desirable by
consolidations of one kind or another. For example, stocks No. 21
(New York Central) and No. 22 (Hudson River) Were used from
January 1857 to January 1870, and stock No. 23 (New York Central
and Hudson River) from January 1870 to January 1936. However,
if a stock became so inactive as to lack quotations for many months
at a time, it was usually dropped from the list. In some instances stocks
were not used while the railroad was in the hands of a receiver and
undergoing reorganization. In a very few instances they were not used
during a period in which exceptional circumstances only negligibly re-
lated to their investment values were' violently disturbing their prices.
Thus Northern Pacific was not used during the year of the corner
(1901). Sometimes it was possible to bring a stock back into the list.
For example, Northern Pacific was brought back in January 1906.
(Footnote 12concluded)
numbers of the prices of copper mining stocks or cotton mill, stocks back'as far as
January 1857—the date we begin our railroad indexes—few persons would claim
that such indexes would have anything approaching the general economic signifi-
cance of an index of prices of the railroad stocks. And their relation to the yields
of railroad bonds—which are the bonds we have used—would be difficult to inter-
pret.
The monthly 'index of industrial stock prices' of the New York Federal Reserve
Bank runs from January 1872 to date.But itis, in its early years, composed en-
tirely of transportation, communication and mining stocks. The stocks used in 1872
were: Adams Express, American Express, Consolidated Coal, Delaware and Hud-
son Canal, Maryland Coal, Pacific Mail, Quicksilver Mining, Quicksilver Mining,
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But, as may be seen from Chart 32, th.e instances in which a stock was
dropped and later reinstated are few indeed.
Before discussing methods of measuring changes in the general
level of railroad common stock prices, it is desirable to point out some
characteristics of t.he price movements of the individual stocks. We
must remember that, though their 'grades' may not he definitely meas-
urable, the stocks are of different grades.Some are more specula-
tive—less like high grade bonds—than others. Though all are 'common'
stocks, they vary in their degrees of 'commonness'.
Appendix A, Table 14 gives the percentage that the price of each
stock, in any particular January, was of the price of the same stock
in the preceding January. Chart 12 presents 79 frequency distrihu-
January 1858
tions based on this table—one for each year from to January 1857
January 1936
This chart shows that most of these distributions are
January1935
skewed in the direction of the general pricechange. Ina year of rising
pricesthey are skewed to the right; in a year of f ailing prices to the
left.
The poorest stocks—those of the most overboncled roads—tend to
show the greatest percentage price movements, both (luring periods of
collapse and during periods of recovery. Now, though it is not logically
necessary, the poorer stocks usually sell for fewer dollars per share than
do the more conservative and less speculative stocks. The lower priced
stocks, therefore, tend to show greater percentage fluctuations in price
than do the higher priced stocks.'8 But the relation does not exist merely
because the lower priced stocks tend to be the lower grade stocks. It is
partly psychological. Speculators seem to prefer to operate in relatively
low priced stocks. If a sound and conservatively managed corporation,
whose stock sells at a high price per share and shows only small per-
13Buttheir dollar or 'point' movements are generally smallerthanthose of the
higher priced stocks. During a bull market, a stock that begins by selling for $100
a share will probably rise in price a smaller percentage but a larger number of
dollars or 'points' than will a stock that begins by selling for $16 a share.
A curious empirical formula that describes the apparent tendency of price move-
ment fairly well is that stock prices move equal increments on their square roots.
Thus, if in a bull market stocks that sold for $100 per share rise in price to about
$144 a share, stocks that sold for $16 a share will tend to rise to about $36 a share.'DRIFT' AND COMMON STOCK PRICES 145
centage fluctuations, reduces greatly the market price of the stock per
share by paying a large stock dividend, the new and lower priced stock
will almost immediately begin to shpw larger percentage price fluctu-
ations than did the old and higher priced stock.
From such strange material many types of index number could be
constructed. The questions answered by some would be important,
those answered by others would be trivial or even bizarre. Perhaps the
first conclusion that one approaching the subject would come to would
he that there was little if any importance attached to 'one share' as a
unit of measurement. An index number based on totals of the prices
of one share of each stock would he of the same type as an index num-
ber of commodity prices that was based on totals of the prices of one
pound of each commodity. Any aggregate of actual prices calls for
some weighting. The price movements of Pennsylvania stock are more
important than the price movements of Western Maryland.
•With almost no exceptions, the index numbers of stock prices that
are currently published fall into one of three groups. All three are based
upon arithmetic avera The first and largest group
contains indexes. These are arithmetic averages of the
prices of one share of each stock.'4 The second group contains index
numbers in which each stock is weighted by the number of shares out-
The monthly index numbers (see Appendix A, Table 10, col-
unin 6 and Table 17) presented in this chapter fall in this grotip (for
weights, see Appendix A, Table 15).15 The third group contains index
numbers in which the prices of the various stocks are weighted in pro-
portion to their 'activity'—the number of shares that are bought and
sold.'°
The purpose of weighting is to make movements of the prices of
the more 'important' stocks influence movements of the index num-
1.4Oftena set of weights is gradually introduced because of stock dividends. For
example, the New York Times index of the prices of 25 industrial stocks is con-
structed by multiplying the present price of each stock by the number of shares that
now correspond to one share at the time that the stock was introduced into the
index. Though the divisor is still 25, the total number of shares is now much greater
than 25.
Asdo the various weekly and monthly index numbers of stock prices published by
the Standard Statistics Company of New York. Its index numbers extend back to
January 1918.
16ProfessorsIrving Fisher and W. I. Crum have each published index numbers of
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bers more than do movements of the prices of the less important stocks
—if possible, in proportion to their importance. The question becomes
one of deciding what shall be meant by 'importance'? Important for
what? From the standpoint of an individual holder, the 'important'
stocks are those that he owns, and the relative importance of their
(arithmetic) price movement is in the absence of other factors in pro-
portion to the number of shares that he owns of each. But all shares
outstanding are owned by someone. May not the relative social im-
portan.ce of (arithmetic) fluctuations in the price per share of the stock
of a particular corporation, therefore, well be thought of as a func
tion of the number of shares that the corporation has outstanding; and,
in the absence of the disturbing effects of other independent variables
such as the extent to which the stock of the corporation is used as
collateral for loans, etc., may not the relative social importance of
(arithmetic) fluctuations in the price well be thought of as varying
directly with the number of shares outstanding?
It is of course true that, if the price at which a share of stock is sold
be multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding, the resulting
figure may easily be quite unrepresentative of. any intelligent valu-
ation of the entire enterprise. Dr. Wesley C. Mitchell drew attention
to this fact in his Business Cycles (p. 171)
"\'Vhether the market prices of stocks in 100-share lots may be inter-
preted as showing accurately changes in the prices of the business enter-
prises concerned is highly questionable. If 1,000 shares in a railway which
has 100,000 shares outstanding be sold at $80 per share on a given day, it
does not necessarily follow that the whole proprietary interest could be
sold (or bought) for $8,000,000. Indeed, it is seldom safe to infer the
price for the total supply of any kind of goods from the current market
price per unit....thatcannot be known except in the rare cases when
such sales are actually made and the terms published. Hence we must
content ourselves with taking the figures for what they are—prices of
shares in business enterprises."
We must remember, however, when considering the above remarks
of Dr. Mitchell, that, thotigh a multiplication of price per share by
total number of shares outstanding does not necessarily show what
"the whole proprietary interest could be sold (or bought) for", it does
determine the valuation that will be put on each and every one of the
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owners of those parts and by their creditors—such as banks. Loans are
made and are called on the basis of the market prices per share of the
collateral behind the loans..
For most economic purposes the 'importance' of the market price of
a share of the stock of a corporation depends upon the number of shares
outstanding. The economic importance of two shares of stock is not
necessarily greater because they represent interests in two corporations
than it would be if they represented an interest in only one corpora-
tion. To weight prices per share by the number of shares outstanding
would seem a simple and logical way of allowing each separate indi-
vidual share an importance not dependent upon the size of the corpo-
ration to which it belongs. If prices are not weighted by the number
of shares outstanding, the prices of the shares of small corporations are
given an importance they do not merit. If Corporation A has 1,000,000
sharesoutstanding and Corporation B only 100,000, a five dollar rise
in the price per share of the stock of Corporation A tends to be ten
times as important as a five dollar rise in the price per share of the stock
of Corporation B. The price of each separate share in Corporation A is,
we may assume, as important as the price of each separate share in
Corporation B, and there are ten times as many of them.
The usefulness of index numbers of stock prices in which the prices
of the various stocks are weighted in proportion to their market activ-
ity is very restricted. For some theoretical purposes connected with the
'equation of exchange' and for some practical purposes connected with
the forecasting of stock prices by watching changes in the internal
'technical' condition of the market, the relative 'importance' of the
prices of stocks may be thought of as varying directly with the number
of shares sold. During a period in which a speculative football, such as
Auburn Motors once was, is traded in much more actively than the
stock of a much larger and economically more important company, such
as General Motors, there is a sense in which fluctuations in the price of
Auburn are more 'important' than fluctuations in the price of General
Motors. But it is a narrow and technical sense.'7
Index numbers of stock prices that are weighted by 'activity' are sub-
iTOfcourse, when a stock becomes extremely inactive (or abn.ornzally active), its
price may become a much less reliable measure of careful and significant valuation
by the market than it would be in more normal circumstances. But this is a matter
that concerns the adequacy of the pricing process and not the importance of the
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ject to a quasi mathematical drift. In periods of advancing prices there
is a pronounced tendency for individual stocks to be abnormally active
when they are advancing in price more rapidly than the general market.
The opposite tendency—to be abnormally active when they are declin-
ing more rapidly than the general market during a period of general
decline—is very much less pronounced. The reasons for these con-
ditions are partly technical and partly economic; but, if individual prices
are weighted in proportion to the changing turnover of the individual
stocks, the net mathematical result is a pronounced upward drift in the
index number during rising markets, accompanied by a much less pro-
nounced downward drift during falling markets. If a stock moves from
100 to 120 during a short period of great activity (compared with the
activity of other stocks) and falls back to 100 during a long period of
relatively small activity, it affects the index number more while rising
than it does while falling. It is theoreticallypossible for the price of
each stock in the index number to be the same at the end of a period
as it was at t.he beginning, and yet the index number show a pro-
nounced movement.
All existing index numbers of the prices of common stocks contain
'economic drift'. This is not merely almost inevitable but also desirable
and necessary if the indexes are to present faithful. pictures of what
actually occurs. Economic drift is the essential characteristic of the
movements of common stock prices.Those prices are the prices of
radically junior securities and economic drift is the very badge of their
'juniority'. To eliminate it from an index, if that were feasible, would
be nothing short of emasculating the index.
But mathematical drift is a merely disturbing influence, whether it
occurs in a pure or in a disguised and quasi form. Charts 3 and 4 were
introduced to illustrate types of mathematical drift in index numbers
\ofbond yields. Chart 13 performs a similar service for stock prices.
Four index numbers of railroad stock prices are there shown.18 Each
index is a 'chain' number, constructed by chaining together 79 separate
index numbers, each extending from one January to the next. The in-
dexes presented by the upper three lines on the chart (A, B and C) vary
greatly in their movements, but are free from purely mathematical
drift. The index represented by the lowest line on the chart (D) is
subject to violent mathematical drift.
18Forthe figures, see Table 16.'DRIFT' AND COMMON STOCK PRICES
CHART13
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indexes A, lB and C are each l)ased on averages of actual prices. The
differences in their movements result from differences in the types of
average used and from differences in weighting. The averages of index
A are geometric, those of B and C arithmetic. The individual prices
of A and C are unweighted, those of B are weighted each year by the
number of shares outstanding.
From January 1857 to January 1936 index A shows a fall of 34 per
cent, index C a rise of 141 per cent,.but this drift apart is not a purely
mathematical drift in the sense in which we have been using the term.
It is not, for example, a drift whose direction could be predicted for
unknown chance material. Neither the figures of index A nor the fig-
ures of index C would be changed if the time order of the data were
reversed. If the 1936 prices of individual stocks had occurred in 1857,
the 1857 prices in 1936, and the prices of the intervening years had
been correspondingly reversed as to time order, index A would have
advanced from 66 to 100 instead of declining from 100 to 66, and in-
dex C would have declined from 241 to 100 instead of advancing from
100 to 241.
In the absence of substitutions, any quasi mathematical drift found
in the relation between geometric and arithmetic indexes occurs pri-
marily because of differences in the economic drifts of the individua.l
prices. It could not, of course, occur if it were not for a difference in
the mathematical treatment of the data; but its direction and very exist-
ence depend, at all times, or' differences in the individual drifts, and
whenever these individual drifts are large and important, they are of
economic rather than chance origin.
The ratio of the arithmetic average of n positive quantities to the
1
geometric average of the same quantities equals—th of the sum (i.e.,
the arithnietic average) of the ratios of the individual quantities to
the geometric average.'9 The product and hence the geometric average
LetA represent the arithmetic average •and G the geometric average. Then the
n individual quantities may be represented by Gx1, Gx0, Gx3,.. . where
each x represents the ratio of a particular individual quantity to the geometric
average. Now A, the arithmetic average of the n quantities, of course equals
G(x,+x2+x3+...
Hence the ratio of the arithmetic average to the
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of these individual ratios necessarily equals unity, but their arithmetic
average varies with and constitutes a species of measure of the 'scatter'
of the original quantities. With both stock prices and bond prices (in
the sense of the reciprocals of their yields), this scatter tends to dc-
crease with the passage of time; though it sometimes increases for
fairly long periods.But, whether it decreases or increases depends
upon economic characteristics of the data rather than upon mathe-
matical characteristics of the index numbers.
The economic characteristics of stock price data are such that
changes and substitutions among the stocks tend to affect index A much
more seriously than they do index C. Stocks may be removed from an
index because the road has gone into bankruptcy; they are never re-
moved (if sales continue to he regularly made) because of the excessive
prosperity of the corporation. Now index A is much more affected by a
specified percentage change• in the price of a low priced stock than is
index C. And the percentage changes of reall.y low priced stocks are,
or at least have been (on the way down), gigantic.
The effect on index A of carrying a stock into bankruptcy and then
removing it from the index may be almost impossible to over-
come, though the effect on index C be relatively small. If, in the final
year that a stock was in the indexes, its price began the year at 4 and
ended it at 1, the effect on index A would be no more than merely off-
set by a later rise in the price of another stock from 25 to 100.And,
even if the low priced stock was not removed from the index but was
carried through a reorganization of the road, the mere process of re-
organization would render improbable a percentage recovery in the
new stock sufficiently great to offset a previous decline of the old stock
into the region of zero.
Stock prices are unlike commodity prices in that commodity prices,
as handled by the maker of ipdex numbers, are the prices of new and
not of second-hand or worn-out commodities. Cost of production p1_e-
vents the prices of new commodities dropping to zero, or eveti close
to zero, and remaining there. Though an index based on unweighted
geometric averages fulfills the 'circular test' and, in that sense, has no
strictly mathematical drift, it develops a quasi mathematical drift when
(Footnote 19concluded)
A x1 ++ x3 +..+
geometric average, or —equals
GV
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it is constructed from data, such as stock prices, in which the size of
the ratiofluctuationstends to increase as the price declines, approach-
ing infinity as zero prices are approached, and in which there exists
the very real possibility of permanently zero prices.
It is of general and fundamental importance to realize that the ap-
plicability, to any specific data, of no type of averaging or weighing
can be determined a priori—by mere mathematical analysis—without
considering the characteristics of the data and the purposes of the aver-
aging. This view of the subject takes 'averaging' out of the vacuum
in which it is so often discussed.
Even the index ntimber represented by the lowest line (D) of Chart
13, subject as it is to the most violent mathematical drift, is perfectly
adapted to answer certain practical questions. It is exactly the index
number required to measure the changing fortune of aninvestor who
began, in any January, by investing equal amounts of money in each
stock and, in each following January, rearranged his portfolio so that
once again the market values of his individual holdings would be iden-
tical.
To the extent that index numbers based upon arithmetic averages
of 'relatives' tend to show a definite upward drift even if constructed
• froni mere chance data, their drift is purely mathematical. But the drift
in index D is greater than would occur with chance data. This is largely
the result of the fact that, during the four greatest upward surges of
the railroad stock market, the lower priced and more speculative stocks
enjoyed a much greater percentage advance than did the higher priced
and more conservative stocks. And the lower the price of the stock the
greater the number of shares used in index D. As the price advances
the number of shares is reduced, new low priced stocks receiving the
excessive weighting.
But, for the purpose of comparing the movements of stock prices
with the movements of bond yields, this quasi mathematical element
in the drift is as disturbing as is the purely mathematical element. It is
as undesirable to overweight low priced stocks as it would be to over-
weight high priced stocks. We are even less interested in how an indi-
vidual investor would have fared if he had always kept an equal amount
of money invested in each security than how he would have fared had
he always held the same number of shares of each security. Our prob-
lem is a social and not a merely individualistic one. We are concerned'DRIFT' AND COMMON STOCK PRICES 153
with railroad common stocks as a type of security. We are therefore in-
terested in what happened to railroad common stockholders as a class,
but not in what would have happened to an individual if he had played
the market in this way or that. We are interested in the changing value
of the entire railroad system of the country—in so far as market prices
can be used to measure changes in that value—rather than in changes.
in the price of arbitraryand insignificant or fluctuating and misleading
units.
And, for such a purpose, there is only one index number. Indeed,
were it not for changes in the number of shares outstanding and for the
occurrence of amalgamations, consolidations and reorganizations with
the attendant necessity of substitutions. and changes in the list of stocks
used, no question would ever arise. The price per share of each stock
would, without discussion, be multiplied by the number of shares out-
standing in order to obtain a figure for the total 'equity' value of each
corporation—its worth to its stockholders. And these totals would then
be added together. But, with not only changes in number of shares out-
standing but also changes in capital structure that alter or even destroy
the significance of the price of 'one share', 'chain' index numbers be-
come absolutely necessary. Index B of Chart 13 is such a number.
The movements of index B are naturally more like those of index C
than they are like those of index D. There is always some tendency
for the stocks of the larger roads to be more conservative investments
and therefore less violent in their price movements than the stocks of
the smaller roads. Index B gives the greatest weight to the prices per
share of the larger roads. It weights the various stocks in proportion
to number of shares outstanding. Index C reduces this logical and de-
sirable disparity of weighting by using only one share of each road.
The larger roads receive no more weight than do the smaller. But index
D goes so much further in this direction that it tends to introduce a
system of inverse weighting. In so far as the stocks of the large roads
are conservative and high priced and the stocks of the small roads
speculative and low priced, the system of weighting is a complete rever-
sal of common sense. The large companies are weighted the least
heavily, the small companies the most heavily.
Index B is the only stock price index for which we present monthly
figures. In the calculation of each link in the chain number (fromone
January to the next), prices were adjusted for all stock dividends,154 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
rights, etc., that occurred during the thirteen months. After this had
been done, the adjusted prices per share were multiplied by the num-
ber Of shares outstanding in the earlier January. We used total num-
her of shares outstanding rather than number of shares in the hands
of investors other than railroads. The difference in the two types of
index numbers would undoubtedly be microscopic, and the calculation
of the weights, under the non-railroad investor assumption, would have
been a piece of foolish labor.
Even if there were good reasons for eliminating all intercompany
holdings when determining weights, it would mean only that our index
tended to weight slightly more heavily than it should—but not in any
such extreme manner as 'one share each' indexes—the stocks of the
smaller roads. Little railroads do not hold the stocks of big ones to
anything like the extent that big roads hold the stocks of little ones.
Railroads much more usually buy stocks for control or for a voice in
the management than they do for amere share in the profits with other
investors.
Chart 14 presents the monthly movements of the railroad stock
price index number, in which the prices of the individual stocks are
weighted by the number of shares outstanding, and also the monthly
movements of the index number of the yields of high grade
railroad bonds. The bond yield index is inverted and its scale is double
that of the stock price index. As both scales are logarithmic, an upward
movement of the bond yield index resulting from a halving of yields
would, therefore, be of the same size as an upward movement of the
stock index resulting from a quadrupling of prices.
It is at once apparent that the dissimilarities of the major movements
of the two lines are much more striking than the similarities. The major
long term movements of the bond yield line (inverted yields) are: (1)
the irregular but violent up-swing from 1857 into 1864, followed by
the short but violent down-swing into 1866; (2) the great upward
swing from 1869 into 1899; (3) the great downward swing from 1899
to 1920; (4) the great, though extremely irregular, upward swing from
1920 to the date of writing. There was a fair degree of similarity be-
tween the trend movement of stock prices and the trend movement of
tile reciprocals of bond yields (as in the inverted line of Chart 14) from
1857 to 1864. There was, however, in railroad stock prices, no com-
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cals into 1866. During the great swing of the bond yield index from a
high of 6.72 per cent in December 1869 tolow of 3.07 per cent in
June 1899, stock prices were see-sawing up and down on a plateau.
There was a drop definitely below the plateau into 1877 and a recov-
ery definitely above the plateau into 1881, but in December 1869 the
stock price index number stood at 37.52 and as late as June 1897 at no
more than 36.45.20 During the first ten years of the great downward
swing of the bond yield line from 1899 to 1920, stock prices doubled
(from 51.14 in June 1899 to 105.83 in August 1909). It is true that
the two lines move down together from 1909 to 1920 and up together
from 1921 to 1927, and that, in the recovery after 1932, the major
trends of both lines are upward. But the movements of the bond yield
line, during the great 1929—32 collapse in stock prices, are little more
than mere irregularities. There is no real similarity between the long
term trends of the two series.
The 'cyclical' movements of the two series are much more closely
related than are the long term trends. Lines D and E of Chart 21 repre-
sent the deviations of the bond yield and stock price mathematical
graduations (presented, with the data, in Chart 14) from cycle-elimi-
nating mathematical trends. Though there appear serious variations
in the lags and even, at times, extra 'cycles' in one or other of these
two deviations lines, there is, over the whole period, a real and rather
striking similarity between them.
But the reader must remember that the disturbing effects of the dis-
similarities of the long term trends do not exist in these deviations
series. The short swings of the data, as they actually occur, show a
much less uniform similarity between the two series than do the devi-
ations. And even the similarity between the two sets of deviations is,
as we have said, by no means uniformly close. Th.e elimination of long
term trend creates maxima and minima in the deviations series that
do not exist in the original series. The deviations curve tends to pass
through the zero line where mere points of inflection occur in the orig-
inal series. For example, the stock price collapse that began in 1876
is accompanied by only a levelling off of the movement of the bond
yield line of Chart 14. But in Chart 21 the deviations lines are strik-
ingly similar in their movements through 1873, '74, '75, and '76. Simi-
20 For the figures from which Chart 14 was constructed see columns 5 and 6 of
Table10.'DRIFT' AND COMMON PRICES
larly, the stock price rise into the sharp peak of 1902 is accoinpanied
by a fallinthe (inverted) bond yield line of Chart 14. The stock price
collapse of the next year (1903) is accompanied, not by a reversal of
direction after a rise, but only by an increased rate of decline of the
(inverted) bond yield line of Chart 14. But, in Chart 21, the two series
each show a definite minimumin1902.
In exceptional instances, the deviations curves of Chart 21 require
very careful interpretation if they are not to be misleading. And,in at
least one instance—when they suggest a stock price maximum (mini-
mum on the inverted deviations line of Chart 21) attheend of 1930—
one naturally feels that the mathematical rigidity of the 'cycle-eliniinat-
ing' trend curve has introduced a palpable absurdity into the data. The
collapse of (raw) stock prices that began in the autumn of 1929 was
so sudden and the downward movement so precipitate and long-con-
tinued that the trend curve, in its efforts (if we may be permitted to
use such an expression) to handle 1930, 1931 and 1932, turned down
even more steeply than the seasonal-eliminating graduation of the
data.
That the short term or cyclical movements of stock prices and bond
prices (as reciprocals of yields) should be more alike than the long term
trends, if not as to the amplitude at least
0 --if r'---. — I
ments,is as one would expect. The down swing of the economic cycle
is a period in which the general demand -is not primarily for more
secure investments, but for more cash. It is a period of 'liquidation'—
a period in which an extraordinarily large percentage of debtors are
being forced to pay off or reduce their debts, a period in which they
are attempting to sell rather than merely to improve the grade of the
securities in their portfolios.' A reverse process goes on during recov-
ery. As the community emerges from the vicious circle of compulsory
debt payment or bankruptcy, with its inevitably depressing effects on
potential investors who fear further declines,all types of security
soon tend to advance.
The cyclical fluctuations of common stock prices are 'greater than
the cyclical fluctuations of the prices of high grade bonds not merely
because the expectation of future payment from the stocks fluctuates
while that from the high grade bonds remains virtually constant bu-t
also because the stocks are, to a much greater extent than are bonds,
21Stock prices, butnot bond yields, are inverted in Chart 21.158 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
carried on loans. But the cyclical movements of the two types of se-
curity have essentially the same relation to the business cycle, the cycle
of confidence, the cycle of debt contraction and debt expansion.22
But there are no such simple reasons for expecting the long term
treads ofthe two series to be similar. The compulsory liquidation on
the cyclical decline and the plethora of funds for investment on the
cyclical advance are each, in a sense, reactions from conditions that
had become, both economically and psychologically, thoroughly ex-
treme. A cyclical decline in stock prices is primarily a result of pres-
sure rather than of a change in anticipated earnings—important as
such a change may be. But this is not true of long continued move-
ments of stock prices. Those movements are primarily the result of
changes in anticipated earnings. But the prices of high grade bonds
move with stock prices in business cycles, not because of the earn-
ings factor but because of the pressure factor. For a changing list of
bonds that are always of superlative grade, changes in the earnings
factor may be assumed to be negligible.
And finally, the demonstration that the long term trends of the two
series should not be expected to be necessarily the same may be put
into the form of a reductio ad absurdurn. If we assume that the long
term movements of the prices (or yields) of bonds of superlative grade
are much the same whether the bonds be railroad, industrial or public
utility bonds, we realize that there is no inherent reason why the prices
of superlative railroad bonds should not rriove up and down on their
long time trends with the prices of industrial or public utility stocks
as closely as with the prices of railroad stocks. Btit, while the cyclical
movements of the three types of stock have usually been timed almost
the same, their long term trends have often been quite For
example, while railroad stock prices were declining from 1909 to 1920,
the secular trend of industrial stock prices was definitely upward, from
1910 to 1919 strongly so.
Of course, if we were to compare stock price movements with the
movements of the prices of low grade long term bonds, we should ex-
pect to find a greater similarity than if the comparison were with bonds
of superlative grade. But the increase in similarity, though definite,
would not necessarily be great. We must remember that a bond, with
22Itis because it is a cycle of confidence that the movements of stock prices tend
to lag behind those of bonds.